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Abstract
This paper develops a two-country stock-flow consistent model to analyse the relationship
between advanced and emerging countries. The relationship between the two countries is asym-
metric: advanced countries are characterised by an institutional investors’ sector which invests in
both domestic and emerging markets assets, whereas emerging markets own advanced countries
assets as a result of foreign exchange reserves accumulation by their central bank. The paper
aims to show how the portfolio choice of institutional investors, which have return requirements
to meet, is the key driver of financial stability in emerging markets, particularly by determining
the dynamics of the exchange rates of emerging markets economies. Their role, compared to a
standard open-economy model may be stabilising or de-stabilising, depending on the nature of
the shock that induces changes in portfolio choices. The paper also shows how “intermediate”
exchange rate regimes, as commonly found nowadays in the practice of emerging markets central
banks, may be succesful at containing such instabilities.
Keywords: Institutional Investors, Emerging Markets, Stock-Flow Consistent Models, Exchange
Rates
JEL Codes: E12, F30, G11, G23
Introduction and background
Emerging markets (EMs) integration into the global financial system has often faced diﬃculties. The
currency and financial crises in East Asia in the late 90’s represent a well-known example in which a
situation leading foreign investors to quickly sell their assets resulted in a large systemic crisis, with
collapses in asset prices and exchange rates. All these crises were usually preceded by a boom in
capital flows to these countries, triggered by some domestic or global event, which abruptly came to
an end.
Exchange rates typically follow such cycles, appreciating with capital inflows and depreciating with
capital outflows. As 1 clearly shows, many EM currencies appreciated to the US dollar, in the years
1
before the crisis, then collapsed in 2008, when the global “flight to safety” put pressure on all the world’s
currencies. The subsequent wave of capital inflows to EMs since the 2008 crisis, led to appreciation in
2009-2012 period. However since then, exchange rates in major EMs have started to decline. In 2013,
when speculation about the FED “tapering” Quantitative Easing (QE) policies sparked uncertainty
about the future of capital flows to EMs, which had been conspicuous since the recovery from the 2008
crisis, and led to a sell-oﬀ of EM assets. Continuing rumours about rising interest rates in advanced
countries, coupled with the slowdown and financial troubles in China during the summer of 2015,
maintain the pressure high on emerging markets, though a drastic sell-oﬀ of EM assets as a whole has
not (yet?) occurred.
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Understanding how diﬀerent factors can contribute to these phenomena is crucial for an under-
standing of financial (in)stability of EMs. Dynamic-stochasitc general equilibrium (DSGE) have been
developed to tackle such issues. These models, collectively fitting in the category “international macro-
finance”, feature substantial innovations compared to the standard DSGE models, such as multiple
assets in open-economy models, incomplete financial markets and informational asymmetries1. These
1The inclusion of such features required the development of new techniques (Tille and van Wincoop, 2010; Devereux
and Sutherland, 2011). See Pavlova and Rigobon (2010) for a survey of the literature
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models are able to capture some of the features of international financial conditions EMs, such as the
simultaneous expansion of two-ways gross capital flows, which earlier models were not able to capture
given their focus on current accounts. Devereux and Sutherland (2009) in particular find that EMs
with a long-position in foreign bonds and a negative position in domestic portfolio equities and direct
investments from abroad achieve a good degree of international risk-sharing.
DSGE models of this kind however typically have a Real Business Cycle core and therefore largely
assume away monetary and financial considerations, with the resulting implications on the money
supply and the exchange rate 2. There is also no explicitly modeled financial sector, as the portfolio
choice is made by households seeking to insure their consumption, nor a central bank, which leaves
interest rates to be determined by what is eﬀectively a loanable funds mechanism. This is very much at
odds with recent developments in the literature on financial intermediaries as actors, and risk-aversion
and monetary policy as drivers of capital flows to EMs and global financial stability in general (Bruno
and Shin, 2013; Rey, 2013; Shin, 2013). As Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2015) claim, financial flows
volatility is the crucial driver of vulnerabilities in EMs, especially for what concerns exchange rate
volatility. Moreover, the explosion of cross-border asset holdings in the world (figure 2), including in
EMs, over the past twenty years or so, renders any analysis of international financial phenomena based
on ’real’ rather than a ’monetary’ factors at best incomplete3.
For these reasons, this paper develops an open-economy two-country stock-flow consistent (SFC)
model. These models, unlike real-business cycle models, are monetary from the start and explicitly
include a financial sector, evaluating its role within a macroeconomic system. Furthermore in line with
the general principles of SFC modeling, these ensure that the accounting of the models is complete
and consistent, so that every asset and liability holdings and flows are accounted for.
The standard reference for SFC models with open capital accounts is paper 12 in Godley and
Lavoie (2012), while several additional models have been developed to analyse diﬀerent open-economy
issues4. While this model draws substantially on the basic formulation, it presents several elements
of novelty. Firstly, the relationship between the two countries is explicitly modeled as asymmetrical:
aside from choosing diﬀerent starting values for stocks and flows5, only the advanced country invests in
EM financial assets, whereas the EM foreign investments are confined to the central bank’s holdings of
foreign exchange reserves (FXR). Indeed, as shown in figure 2 and figure ??, EM financial integration
is mostly driven by the liability side, with EM being first recipients of foreign investments, while their
2Devereux and Sutherland (2009) for example assume that the money supply of the home country grows at a constant
rate and determines the price level through a quantity theory of money relationship, with a stochastic velocity term.
There is no independent nominal exchange rate determination, as this price level also represents the ratio of the home
country price to the foreign country price.
3See for example Borio and Disyatat (2011)
4See for exampleLavoie and Zhao (2010); Lavoie and Daigle (2011); Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012); Bortz (2014).
See Caverzasi and Godin (2015) for a more comprehensive survey of the SFC models literature, including open economy
models.
5E.g. National income in the EM at the beginning of the simulation period is half the size of the advanced country.
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foreign holdings always lag behind, and are mostly held as FXR.
Secondly, the advanced country features an institutional investors sector. To the best knowledge of
the author this is the first time this is included in a SFC model. As it will be shown the sector works
as a financial intermediary for the household sector, promising a fixed return on the claims households
hold on them, and investing in financial assets to face those obligations. Their financial behaviour is
characterised, amongst standard portfolio choice considerations, by the search for returns as high as
to ensure their assets are enough to fulfill their long-term obligations. In other words, institutional
investors seek to achieve and maintain a fully-funded status. Their portfolio choice is therefore a
crucial variable determining the international financial dynamics of the model.
This kind of investors have become really important in driving the cross-border capital flows to
EM. As shown in figure 4, holdings have grown substantially6 over the past decade, and in particular
6These allocations are based on the EPFR database, which only captures a part of the total holdings to EM by
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to EM equities before the crisis and to EM bonds in the post-crisis environment. It is a known stylised
fact that most pension funds from advanced countries are currently underfunded (figure 5), which may
induce them to search for returns in riskier assets, such as EM assets. This behaviour is therefore
crucial to determine the dynamics of international financial investment, which are the central focus of
this model.
Finally, EMs’ central banks invest in FXR, but in a way that does not result in either completely
pegged nor flexible, exchange rate regime, but rather a managed float. This is similar to what is done
in Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012), and is very much in line with the empirical reality of EMs,
which in most cases have a managed/dirty floating exchange rate regime with the accumulation of
vast FXR as a buﬀer of safety 7.
It will be shown that the combination of these elements can result in large swings in exchange
rates and capital flows. As institutional investors responds to shocks that have an eﬀect on both their
financial assets and liabilities, their allocation EMs assets vis-à-vis advanced countries change which,
considering their relative sizes, can result in notable changes in exchange rates. The macroeconomic
implications on income and current accounts are also stressed. Moreover the simulation will highlight
the stabilising impact of CB’s in a floating exchange rate regime.
The paper is divided into 5 sections. Section 1 describes the accounting matrices, and some of the
general features of the model. Section 2 goes through the equations of the model. Section 3 discusses
the issue of paramters and variable value choices. Section 5 presents the simulations for two scenarios.
institutional investors. Actual holdings are therefore likely to be higher.
7See for example Calvo and Reinhart (2002); Aizenman et al. (2010)
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Section 6 concludes.
1 Accounting structure and general model features
table 1 describe the balance sheet of the two countries. As discussed, there are five sectors in the
advanced (ADV) country and four in the EM country. The additional sector in the ADV country
is the institutional investor (Inst). Households in both countries only hold domestic bills and high
powered money, issued respectively by their domestic governments and central banks. Central banks
hold domestic bills, and FXR in the EM country as discussed. The production sector is highly
simplified, as in the paper 12 model of Godley and Lavoie (2012): it does not represent an explicit
firm sector and therefore it does not hold fixed capital goods.
The institutional investor sector allocates its assets between domestic Badv_inst, foreign Bem_inst
bills and cash - the residual asset - , and they also have the opportunitty to invest in an additional
advanced country bills Badv2_inst, which oﬀers a higher interest rate than the regular bills. These bills
eﬀectively take the role of of “risky” domestic assets held by institutional investors, the implications of
which will be discussed in the next section. Institutional investors’ liabilities are in the form of accounts
Acc held by households. These accounts yield benefit payments from the institutional investors sector
to households.
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table 2 shows the flows between sectors occurring in one period. Given the simplified production
structure households receive the whole national production as income, i.e. the sum of consumption,
government expenditure plus the trade balance (Y = C +G +X   IM). There is no investment, as
there is no fixed capital in the model, which implies that the model is a stationary state rather than
growth model. Households also receive interest payments on the bills they hold. In addition to that,
households receive benefits Ben from the institutional investor sector and pay contributions Cont to
it. The sum of these terms plus national income minus taxes represent households’ disposable income,
which it is used to finance consumption. The rest is saved and allocated across assets: domestic
bills ( 4Badv_advh) and cash ( 4Hadv_advh). Every year they also acquire (or lose) value in their
accounts held with institutional investors ( 4Acc). This acquisition, as it will be shown, is connected
to contributions made, and to avoiud double counting the term is therefore added between brackets,
meaning that it is not included in the column sum adding up to 0, but it is just a remind of the
accounting change associated with it.
The governments of both countries behave in a standard way for SFC models. The receive tax
revenue from households and central bank profits’, and they use it to finance government expenditure
and service their existing debt. They issue new bills to finance any deficits arising. Similarly central
banks receive interest payments on the bills they hold, which they give to governments, issue cash
and purchase government bills. The EM central bank, as discussed, purchase both ADV bills as FXR
and EM bills. The only source of capital gains/losses are exchange rate swings. An appreciation of
the EM currency vis-à-vis the ADV currency (i.e. an increase in xr), results in capital gains for ADV
institutional investors on the bills they hold, and a capital loss on the EM central bank’s FXR. For
this reason a full revaluation matrix would be redundant. Institutional investors receive contributions
from households, and interest payments on their domestic and foreign bills. They then purchase/sell
across those assets. Once again, their liabilities from accounting standpoint increase by an amount
that is exactly equal to the net acquisition of accounts by households.
The very simple structure of the real side of the economy of this model means that eﬀectively
many issues typical of Post-Keynesian models, which SFC models are broadly part of, are missing.
For example, assuming away a well specified firm sector mens that the issue of income distribution
between capitalists and workers, and the associated issues of inflation and productivity are eﬀectively
assumed away. And similarly, the absence of firms and banks means that credit and “inside-money”
issues are also absent. This clearly dimities the realisticness of the set-up. However, as shown in
Godley and Lavoie (2012), with open-economy models the number of equations starts to grow very
quickly, greatly increasing their complexity at the expense of clarity. Furthermore, there are examples
in which making similar assumptions about fixed prices and comparing the results after relaxing such
assumptions did not result in substantial changes (Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti, 2012). Insofar as the
model has a theoretical-logical purpose and is not used for policy analysis, it is therefore preferable to
make a few simplifying assumptions to gain on clarity and tractability.
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2 Sectoral equations
2.1 Households
Consadv = ↵0adv + ↵1adv · Y dexpadv + ↵2adv · Vadv, 1 (1)
Consem = ↵0em + ↵1em · Y dexpem + ↵2em · Vem, 1 (2)
Y dadv = Yadv +Ben  Cont  Tadv + radv · Badv_advh, 1 (3)
Y dem = Yem   Tem + rem · Bem_emh, 1 (4)
Cont =   · Yadv (5)
4Vadv = Y dadv   Consadv (6)
4Vem = Y dem   Consem (7)
Bdadv_advh = µadv · Vadv (8)
Hdadv_advh = Vadv  Badv_advh (9)
Bdem_emh = µem · Vem (10)
Hdem = Vem  Bem_emh (11)
As discussed households consume, and allocate their non consumed income to diﬀerent assets.
Households’ consumption depends on expected disposable income (Y dexp) and lagged wealth (V 1), as
shown in equation (1) and (2). Disposable income is total national income, minus taxes, plus interest
payments, and in the case of advanced countries, contributions minus benefits from institutional
investors (equation (3) and (7)).
Households’ wealth only changes as a result of net saving, since households in both countries do
not hold any variable price assets, and therefore experience no capital gain/losses (equation (6) and
11
(7)). They allocate wealth in fixed proportion to bills and cash (equations (12)-(15) )8.
Contributions in ADV are determined by the dynamics of the economy. equation (5) states that
contributions are equal to a proportion   of current national income. It is easy to conceive such a
relation in terms of a funded pension system: the proportion   is the contribution rate out of income
that current workers have to pay in to their pension fund in order to accrue benefits. Much like taxes,
this is an automatic deduction to current income. For this reason it is best to treat this as a cash-flow
concept that is imposed onto households rather than part of their portfolio choice.
2.2 International trade and production
log(Xadv) = ✏oadv + ✏1adv · log(xr) + ✏2adv · log(Yem) (12)
log(Xem) = ✏oem + ✏1em · log(1/xr) + ✏2em · log(Yem) (13)
IMadv = Xem · xr (14)
IMem = Xadv · 1/xr (15)
Yadv = Consadv +Gadv +Xadv   IMadv (16)
Yem = Consem +Gem +Xem   IMem (17)
In line with most SFC models, exports are determined by prices and income in logarithmic terms,
so that parameters represent elasticities (equation (12) and (13)). However in this model, as the
production process is simplified so that it does not feature flexible prices, the only relevant price is the
nominal exchange rate9. As it is a two-country model, imports of a country are exactly equal to the
exports of the other countries, as represented by the imports equations (14) and (15), which ensure
the consistency of the accounting.
By construction the balance of payments of each country is as follows:
CAadv = Xadv   IMadv + rem · Bem_inst, 1 · xr   radv · Badv_emcb, 1 (18)
KAadv = 4Badv_emcb  4Bem_inst · xr (19)
8Superscript s and d indicate demanded, and supplied.
9The same is done in Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012, p. 364)
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CAem = Xem   IMem + radv · Badv_emcb, 1 · 1
xr
  rem · Bem_inst, 1 (20)
KAem = 4Bem_inst  4Badv_emcb · 1
xr
(21)
CAadv = KAadv CAem = KAem
The current account is the sum of the trade balance plus the net balance of interest payments on
foreign assets and liabilities, while the capital account is the diﬀerence between the net purchase of
assets minus the net incurrence of liabilities. Foreign holdings are only in the form of EM bills held
by institutional investors, and FXR held by EM central banks.
2.3 Government and central bank
4Bsadv = Gadv + radv · Bsadv, 1 + radv2 · Bsadv2   Tadv   Fadvcb (22)
4Bsem = Gem + rem · Bsem, 1   Tem   Femcb (23)
Gadv = Gadv (24)
Gem = Gem (25)
Tadv = ✓adv · Yadv (26)
Tem = ✓em · Yem (27)
Fadvcb = radv · Bsadv_advcb (28)
Femcb = rem · Bsem_emcb + radv · Bsadv_advcb · 1/xr (29)
Bdadv_advcb = H
s
adv  Bdadv2_advcb (30)
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Bdadv2_advcb = B
s
adv2  Bsadv2_inst (31)
4Bdem_emcb = 4Hsem  4Bsadv_emcb · 1/xr1 (32)
Bsadv2 = B
s
adv2 (33)
Equations (22) and (23) represent the government budget constraint: government expenditures
plus interest payments, minus tax revenues and central bank profits, is equal to the net issuance of
government bills, which are assumed to be the only financing mechanism for governments10. Govern-
ment expenditures are fixed (equations (24) and (25)), and taxes are a fixed proportion on current
national income (equations (26) and (27)). Central banks receive interest payments on government
bills they hold, and these profits are then transferred to governments (equations (28) and (29)).
Central banks balance sheets identies are expressed in equation (30) and (32). From equation
33, it can be seen that the high-yield the asset’s existing stock is constant, with the central bank
acting as a dealer of last resort, depending on institutional investors’ demand31. Realistically, these
securities should represent private sectors’ liabilities, such as equities or corporate bonds. But under
the simplified framework of this model, where the production sector has no fixed capital holdings,
liabilities can only be issued by the government. The high-yield government bills could represent
securities with a long-term maturity11, or issued by other public sector bodies - e.g. agencies or local
authorities-, which, given the higher default and/or holding risk, could justify the higher the higher
returns.
2.4 Institutional investors
Acc = Acc 1 + Cont    · Acc 1 (34)
Ben = Acc 1 · rˆinst +   · Acc 1 (35)
Vinst = Vinst, 1 + CFinst + CGinst (36)
CFinst = Cont Ben+ rem · Bsem_inst, 1 · xr + radv · Bsadv_inst, 1 + radv2 · Bsadv2, 1 (37)
10This choice is made to avoid the complication of bond prices, which in the open economy would have considerably
complicated the determination of exchange rates and asset prices.
11Indeed the addition of this bill has the same impact of long-term bonds in Godley and Lavoie (2012) chapter 4’s
model, at least for the case where central banks act to keep the price of such bonds fixed.
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CGinst = 4xr · Bsem_inst, 1 (38)
rinst = (rem · Bsem_inst, 1 · xr + radv · Bsadv_inst, 1 + radv2 · Bsadv2, 1 + CGinst)/Vinst, 1 (39)
Institutional investors are the key innovation of the model. As previously discussed, they receive
contributions from the household sector and give them in return an account balance. Such accounts
therefore accumulate with new contributions from households minus a proportion   that is returned
to households ((34)). Similarly, benefits are equal to the previous period outstanding balance in the
accounts times a guaranteed return rˆinst, plus the same proportion   ((35)).
The logic behind these equations is the following. Current workers pay contributions to build up
their accounts with institutional investors. Institutional investors pay benefits to households, both by
delivering the guaranteed returns, and by returning part of the account balance that workers have
hitherto accumulated12. This latter element is again easily exemplified by a funded pension scheme:
workers accumulate benefits entitlements, but these are drawn down as benefits are paid. Therefore,
as a whole the household sector accumulates claims on institutional investors whenever their current
contributions exceed the level of repayments, formally when Cont =   · Yadv >   · Acc 1. It is easy
to see that this eﬀectively occurs when the economy whenever national income increases from one
period to another, i.e. in conditions of economic expansion: as contributions are directly proportional
to current income, in a stationary setting they will increase above drawdown of past accounts, only if
income increases above the previous period’s level. Equivalently, if the economy falls and the level of
contributions keep falling, as a whole the households sector will be losing their claims on institutional
investors, as benefits are paid out. In the limit case where contributions are zero, it will take 1/ 
years to empty the accounts13.
Institutional investors assets are the sum of the previous period’s assets, plus the net cash flows
balance, plus/minus capital gains/losses (equation (36)). The cash flow of institutional investors is
the balance between benefits and contributions, plus investment income, i.e. interest payments on
their domestic and foreign bills holdings ( equation(37)). Capital gains only occur as a result of
exchange rate swings (equation (38)). The actual rate of return of institutional investors is equal to
investment income and capital gains over previous period wealth (equation (39)). It is intuitive to see
that institutional investors assets and liabilities can diﬀer, insofar as their rate of return rinst diﬀers
from the one they guaranteed rˆinst 14.
12Logically this is very similar to a loan with repayments on the principal, with households being the lender and
institutional investors the borrower.
13This suggests an interpretation of   as a measure of longevity of the population: the higher it is the longer it takes
for claims of households to be completed cancelled, meaning that the population is living longer.
14This can also be shown formally. By merging (34) and (35) the following is obtained:
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PBO = Acc · (1 + rˆinst)
tpbo
(1 + rpbo)tpbo
(40)
rpbo = radv + ⌧ (41)
fg = 1  Vinst
PBO
(42)
Equations (40), (41) and (42) define the accounting valuations of institutional investors’ liabili-
ties. Institutional investors such as pension funds and insurers, typically estimate their liabilities by
discounting the future value of benefits. Aside from making assumptions about the future value of
benefits/premia to be paid, a key variable to be chosen is the discount rate. This is very often closely
related to a highly-rated bond yield. In this model the benefits calculation is simplified, and only
depends recursively on the previous year accounts’ balance. Projected benefits obligations (PBO)
therefore are approximated with a 10-year forward looking rule-of-thumb, calculated as end of pe-
riod’s accounts, carried forward by maturing tpbo years at the rate rˆinst and discounted back with the
rpbo discount rate (equation (40)). The discount rate is a simple markup over interest rates on bills
(equation (41)). The funding gap (fg) measures the magnitude of the deviation from full funding, i.e.
when current assets are equal to PBO (equation (42)).
Bdadv_inst
V expinst
=  0    1fg +  2 · radv (43)
Bdem_inst
V expinst
= [(1   0) +  1fg    2 · radv]·
"
(1   01) +  02 · rem    03 · radv2 +  04 ·
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!#
(44)
Bdadv2_inst
V expinst
= [(1   0) +  1fg    2 · radv]·
"
 01    02 · rem +  03 · radv2    04
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!#
(45)
Acc = Acc 1 · (1 + rˆinst) + Cont Ben
and likewise by replacing (37) and (38) into (36), and making use of the relationship expressed by (39), the following
is obtained:
Vinst = Vinst, 1 · (1 + rinst) + Cont Ben
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Hdadv_inst = Vinst  Bsem_inst · xr  Bsadv_inst  Bsadv2_inst (46)
Equations (44), (43) and (46) define the asset allocation of institutional investors. The general
structure is the standard Tobinesque portfolio choice mechanism typical of all SFC models, with a
decomposition of EM returns into a interest rate plus expected exchange rate appreciation (dxrexp).
However, the portfolio choice follows a liabilty-driven investment mechanism15, whereby the institu-
tional investors sector operates a distinction between “safe” assets and “return-seeking” assets according
to their funding levels and the base interest rates.
Portfolio choice is in this sense a two-step procedure. In the first stage institutional investors decide
how much to allocate to domestic bills and how much to the return-seeking portfolio, which depends
on two factors. The first is the impact of their funding gap fg, which has a positive impact on the
allocation to return-seeking assets. The higher the gap, the higher the need for returns to fill such
a gap and therefore the higher the allocation to higher-yielding assets. The second is the levels base
interest rates - what is measured by the impact of  2 -, which can be interpreted as both a return
factor, which makes domestic bills more attractive by definition, but also as a risk-appetite factor:
as the literature mentioned in the introduction discusses, monetary policy is the crucial determinant
of the overall level of investors risk-appetite, generating an in inverse relationship between the policy
rates and risk-taking.
In the second stage they decide the composition of the return-seeking portfolio, i.e. they allocate
assets between EM and high yield ADV bills, depending on their relative characteristics. Such char-
acteristics are the usual linear combination of returns, plus the component is the element in brackets
after  4, which represents the impact of FXR. FXR are seen as an element that decreases the per-
ceived systemic risk of EM, and therefore accumulating them makes EM bills more attractive vis-a-vis
high-yield advanced countries’ bills. The positive parameter  4 is supposed to capture this relation-
ship: whenever FXR are higher than a set level - equal to the value in the steady state of the model -
allocation to EM increases.
Realised cash holdings, as in all SFC models, are the residual element from asset allocation.
2.5 Asset supplies and exchange rate regime closure
Hsadv = H
d
adv_inst +H
d
adv_adh (47)
Hsem = H
d
em_emh (48)
Bsadv_advh = B
d
adv_advh (49)
15See Appendix for futher details.
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Bsadv_inst = B
d
adv_inst (50)
Bsadv2_inst = B
d
adv2_inst (51)
Bsem_emh = B
d
em_emh (52)
Bsadv_advcb = B
d
adv_advcb (53)
Bsem_emcb = B
d
em_emcb (54)
Equations 47 to (53) describe asset supplies. Households and institutional investors achieve their
desired levels of domestic bills holdings, and cash is supplied on demand. Central banks also purchase
as much bills as they need.
xr =
Bdem_inst
Bsem_inst
(55)
Bsem_inst = B
s
em  Bsem_emcb  Bsem_emh (56)
4Bsadv_emcb =  1 ·4Bdem_inst (53a)
4Bsadv_emcb =  2 ·4Yem · xr (53b)
Bsadv_emcb = B¯
s
adv_emcb (53c)
The above equations define the exchange rate, and FXR accumulation by the EM central bank, and
together determine the closure of the system. The exchange rate is determined in the EM bills market,
depending on the relative excess demand or supply by foreign institutional investors (equation (55)).
The supply of EM bills to institutional investors Bsem_inst depends on the toal supply minus domestic
demand, and therefore crucially depends on the holdings of the central bank, and its FXR level.
Therefore the three diﬀerent closures of the system are determined by equation (53), which represent
diﬀerent behaviour by the EM central bank with respect to its accumulation of FXR. Equations (53a)
and (53b) show two diﬀerent versions of a managed floating regime: in the first one, which represent
the baseline scenario, the central bank simply tries to counterbalance part of the private capital inflows
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coming from abroad, eﬀectively trying to avoid excessive volatility of the exchange rate and create a
buﬀer against the new liabilities of the country; in the second one the central bank FXR increase with
GDP expressed in foreign currency16. Equation (53c) represent a pure floating exchange rate regime,
where the level of FXR is constant.
A fixed exchange rate regime has been deliberately discarded as it is a non-realistic description of
current exchange rate arrangements for the great majority of EM economies17. A pure float is also
quite uncommon in EM countries, but it is used as a control case to see the eﬀect of foreign exchange
intervention.
2.6 Expectations
V expinst = Vinst, 1 + CFinst, 1 (57)
Y dexpadv = Y d
exp
adv, 1 +  (Y dadv, 1   Y dexpadv, 1) (58)
Y dexpem = Y d
exp
em, 1 +  (Y dem, 1   Y dexpem, 1) (59)
dxrexp = ¯dxr
exp (60)
Expectations are treated in a rather simplified way. Institutional investors’ wealth expectations are
equal to the previous period’s value plus the previous period’s cash flow (equation (57)). Households’
disposable income expectations follow a standard adaptive process (equation (58) and (59)). Following
paper 12 model in Godley and Lavoie (2012), there are no specified expectations about the exchange
rate value, but only expectations about appreciation/deprecation, which is zero on average.
3 Initial values and stationary steady state
The structure of the model is now complete. With 60 equations (excluding a number of “control”
equations which have no causal role but only serve to track the evolution of other variables) and 104
variables, the model is relatively compact, considering it features two economy and the addition of
new sector 18. This is mostly due to the simplifications on trade and production, with no separate
equations for ’real’ values, which would eﬀectively almost double the amount of existing equations.
As with all SFC models, values for parameters, exogenous variables and the initial values for the
endogenous variables had to be chosen. What follows is a brief overview of some of these choices, also
16This is chosen for convenience, diﬀerent values such as a fixed ratio to imports, showed no substantial diﬀerences.
17See Ghosh et al. (2015)
18The model in paper 12 of Godley and Lavoie (2012) has over 90 equations.
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presented schematically in table 3. As a general choice method, most parameters were chosen with
values in line with those of the SFC literature, or using stylised facts from the empirical evidence.
Moreover, these values have to comply with the stationary steady state of the model, which forms the
baseline scenario.
Table 3: Parameters and variables values
Parameter Value Exogenous variables Value
↵1adv 0.8 G¯adv 300
↵2adv 0.15 G¯em 150
↵1em 0.8 radv 0.05
↵2em 0.14 rem 0.025
  0.05 rˆinst 0.033
µadv 1/6 Initial values
endogenous variables
µem 0.2 Yadv 1000
✓adv 0.3245 Yem 500
✓em 0.31 Bsadv 1200
  0.075 Bsem 400
⌧ 0.005 Bsadv2 166.667
 0 0.6 Hsadv 500
 2 5 Hsem 300
 01 0.625 xr 1
 02 4.2 Acc 666.667
 03 5 Vinst 666.667
 04 0 ¯dxr
exp 0
 1 0.5
 2 0.4
  0.3
✏1adv = ✏1em 0.7
✏2adv = ✏2em 1
In a stationary state there should be not changes in balance sheets, and therefore no net saving.
As a result, the ↵ parameters determining consumption are chosen with values very close to Godley
and Lavoie (2012), but slightly higher to ensure that Y d = Cons in both countries. Asset allocation
of households was chosen to consist mostly in cash holdings, since ADV households hold much of
their financial assets indirectly through institutional investors, and EM households being from a non-
advanced country do not invest much in financial markets.
The portfolio allocation of institutional investors has been chosen to be heavily skewed towards
advanced countries bills - 60% to Badv, 25% to Badv2 and 15% Bem. These paramters result in a 60-40
allocation to liability-matching vs return seeking assets, and also reflect the well known phenomenon
of home-bias. The behavioural parameters   determining such allocation were chosen to values close to
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5, as in Godley and Lavoie (2012). The funding gap parameter  1, was chosen to be smaller than the
returns parameter.  4 was chosen to be zero in the baseline case, but will be activated in alternative
scenarios to assess its impact.
Parameters   and   were chosen to be 0.05 and 0.0875. This was a rather arbitrary choice, but
reasonable considering it implies a stationary pension fund balance sheet - i.e. a funding gap equal to
zero - with a 5% contribution rate in the baseline steady state. Tax to GDP parameters ✓ are higher
than those chosen by Godley and Lavoie (2012), but are actually much closer to the OECD average
level of 33.7% as of 201219. Chosen values for elasticity parameters to trade ✏ are the same as in
Godley and Lavoie (2012).
Interest rates were chosen to be 2.5% in ADV, 4.2% for the high-yield ADV bill, and 5% in EM.
Again this is to reflect the existing reality of bonds issued in emerging markets promising a higher
yield. The guaranteed rate of return rˆinst on institutional investors’ account is 3.3%, chosen to ensure
a higher rate than domestic government bills. The parameter ⌧ is 0.05, a spread over the ADV’ interest
rate. This implies that in the baseline steady state rˆinst = rinst = rpbo and likewise Vinst = Acc = PB.
Values chosen for  1 is again rather arbitrarily chosen expressing that the EM central bank will
purchase FXR by exactly half the amount by which EM’s foreign liabilities increase in foreign currency
terms in the baseline scenario. The value chosen for  2 on the other hand are very much in line with
the data, e.g. the average of developing Asia FXR to GDP was 40% in 2008 (Park and Estrada, 2009).
The supply of financial assets was also chosen to respect existing stylised facts. Public debt to
GDP levels are higher in ADV than in EM, although government expenditures are more or less the
same. ADV’s GDP is twice as big as EM’s. The size of the institutional investors sector is slightly
smaller than in the real world, e.g. the OECD average for pension funds’ assets to GDP is 86%20
compared to 66.67% of the model. Without changing the structure of the model, increasing the size of
the institutional investors’ sector would however generate diﬀerent problems, as it would require the
increase in the supply of either cash, or bills, which would make model asset to GDP levels implausibly
high, or reduce institutional investors return below the base interest rate.
In the simulation exercises, the value of some of these parameters will be changed, as means of a
robustness check. Especially those parameters expressing the most crucial and/or novel relationships,
such as  1 and  1 will be subject to changes, as to ensure the model’s result are not only a reflection
of the initial choice of the parameters’ values.
4 Simulation
Three diﬀerent scenarios are generated, where the baseline model - the stationary case - is shocked
by modifying the value of exogenous variables or parameters. All the scenarios are simulated for 500
19Source: OECDstat
20Source: OECDstats
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periods. The main variable of interest will be the exchange rate, as it eﬀectively summarises how most
of the other variables will change.
4.1 Scenario 1: EM growth story
In the first scenario, the  01 parameter is shocked downwards, thus increasing the allocation to EM
bills within the return-seeking portfolio. The interpretation of such a change is that institutional
investors see potential in the EM assets, following for example a new positive outlook for the future
of the country, or simply because they find information about it more accessible, and therefore are
induced to increase their allocation to EM bills.
The initial eﬀect on the exchange rate is straightforward: as shown in figure 6, there is an initial
spike in the exchange rate, since the higher allocation to EM bills generate excess demand and,
through equation (55), an appreciation of the EM currency. The appreciation generates a trade deficit
(figure 7), which in turn generates a government deficit, increasing the supply of government bills.
The excess supply of government bills generates a depreciation of the exchange rate, and over time
improves the trade balance and eventually the current account balance, which registers a surplus. As
a result the excess supply of government bills reverses, the exchange rate appreciates until it stabilises
at a new lower equibrium level.
Figure 6: Exchange rate and funding gap
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Response of the exchange rate and EM current account after an increase in desire to hold EM bills
At the new lower level for the exchange rate, the trade balance is in a surplus, and as a result GDP
is also at a higher equilibrium level (figure 7). As the current account is in balance, the trade surplus
is oﬀset by a net factor income deficit. Despite the higher level of reserves held by the central bank,
the increased allocations to EM by foreign institutional investors generate a higher foreign debt level,
therefore worseing the net factor income surplus.
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Figure 7: GDP and current account components
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Response of GDP, trade balance and net factor income after an increase in the desire to hold EM bills
A key force shaping the dynamics of the system is the funding gap on portfolio choice (figure 8).
The initial increase is allocation to EM bills is mitigated by the eﬀect of the funding gap: the higher
returns initially earned by institutional investors, due to exchange rate appreciation and higher income
returns as a result of the portfolio shift, improve the funding levels of the sector. The result of this
process is that the exchange rate initially appreciates by less than in it would have been with households
investors, therefore generating a smaller current account deficit. After the initial shock however, due
to the lower funding gap levels institutional investors starts selling their EM positions, thus putting
downward pressure on the exchange rate. This improves the trade balance, which, despite being
smaller than it would have been in a situation without institutional investors is able to push the EM
current account into a surplus. This is due to the lower debt levels originated at the beginning of the
shock period, which generated a much smaller debt servicing burden, thereby lowering the borrowing
requirements of the government, and lowering the increase in foreign debt payments. The resulting
current account surplus eﬀectively induces a shortage of EM assets, which increases the exchange rate
through equation (55). Notably, the new equilibrium level has a negative funding gap, i.e. a funding
surplus.
Given the importance of the funding gap, it is important to study the sensitiveness of the system
the value of the parameter  1. This is shown in figure 9. The result is pretty clear: the higher the
value of  1 the smaller the magnitude of the swings in the short-run and the lower equilibrium level
of the exchange rate. A higher  1 represents a higher willingness of institutional investors to closely
stick to a full funding level (fg = 0), as a result any action resulting in a deviation from it will induce
counterbalancing moves, hence dampening their impact. Therefore with a very high  1 the asset
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Figure 8: Funding gap and share of EM bills
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Eﬀect on the funding gap and the share of EM government bills in the portfolio of institutional
investors, after an increase in the desire to hold EM bills
allocation will change little in both the short and the long-run, and the funding gap will remain closer
to zero. It is not surprising therefore that, conversely, with  1 = 1.5 the magnitude of the swings is
bigger, therefore amplifying the chain of events describe in the previous paragraph, and ultimately
inducing a higher equilibrium exchange rate level.
Finally note the comparison with the  1 = 0, the case where institutional investors act as simle
intermediaries distributing all returns are they achieve them21. The case shown with the  1 = 0 in
figure 9, shows eﬀectively the same chain of events that can be obtained as a result of a similar shock
in Godley and Lavoie (2012): after a liquidity preference shock, the initial response of the system
is the same, with a sudden spike in the exchange rate and then a depreciation following a current
account deficit. However the exchange rate falls to a stabilise at a lower level, compared to all the
other cases. This is due to the higher initial appreciation, giving rise to higher external debt, which
in turn requires a lower exchange rate and a higher trade surplus to face the higher net factor income
deficit. The counterbalancing force given by the funding levels, which contains the initial increase in
allocation to EM bills, results in less sharp movements ofr the exchange rate, both in the short-run
(the initial appreciation) and the long-run (the higher new steady state exchange rate).
So far the simulations have been made under the exchange rate regime described by equation (53a),
with the baseline parameter values. . figure 10 shows what would happen under diﬀerent values for  1,
under a FXR accumulation regime targeting GDP growth as in equation (53b), and under a flexible
exchange rate regime.
Qualitatively the results are very similar under the three regimes. However the EM central bank
21This is obtained by simply replacing rinst = rˆinst = rpboin all equations, and  1 = 0.
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seems to be more successful at realising its intents when accumulating FXR according to equa-
tion (53a), i.e. targeting capital inflows. Under this regime, the exchange rate movements are
subsantially dampened compared to the flexible exchange rate regime, and the adjustment quicker.
Unsurprisingly, this stabilizing impact is higher the higher parameter  1 is. The GDP target seems to
be on the other hand less successful as a stabilising working rule for central banks: in the short-run it
fails to substantially contain the inital appreciation, and even amplifies the subsequent fall, although
it does stabilise the exchange rate at a less depreciated level than in the pure floating case.
The advantage of having a managed floating exchange rate regime seem apparent by these dy-
namics. It gives the central bank the opportunity to accumulate FXR, without having to resort to a
pegged exchange rate, which may present issues for EM that are facing balance of payments deficits.
Following a simple rule of thumb, like purchasing and selling FXR in accordance to capital inflows and
outflows may well be useful policy strategy: as the simulations suggest a “path-dependence” for the
system as a whole, and in particular for exchange rate movements - the smaller the initial appreciation,
the smaller the subsequent depreciation - containing the short-run volatility of exchange rates results
a good strategy to contain the volatility of exchange rates in the long-run.
Intermediate exchange rate regimes also are perfectly consistent with an interest-rate targeting
monetary policy. Although no equation directly relates Hdem and Hsem, the supply and demand for
cash balances in EM, the two are equal in all the simulations, while at the same time, the central
bank’s balance sheet identities remain true. Just like Godley and Lavoie (2012) find for the fixed-
exchange rate case, in a managed floating exchange rate reime the EM central bank is still able to
keep its interest rate fixed, without losing control on the high-powered money supply. This is perfectly
consistent not only with a flexible exchange rate, but also with a managed float.
It is interesting to note, that under such a regime, the accumulation of FXR does not seem to be
particularly correlated with current account movements. As shown in figure 11, when the EM central
bank choose to target capital inflows, FXR accumulation is entirely driven by them, with current
accounts leaning in the same direction as reserves to oﬀset capital inflows. When the EM central bank
targets GDP, FXR are much more stable - which explains why under this regime the exchange rate
is much more volatile -. But even in this case, FXR seem to mostly respond to capital flows rathern
than current account changes.
These figures show the important point made by Borio and Disyatat (2011) that in a monetary
economy, such as that depicted by SFC models, there is no necessary link between current accounts
and FXR accumulation. Two-way gross capital flows very often dwarf net flows, represented by current
accounts, and it is therefore wrong to attach any particular flow to current accounts. “In fact, causality
between the current account and the accumulation of reserves is more likely to run the other way: the
accumulation may reflect the wish to resist the appreciation of the currency, when the authorities face
strong foreign demand for domestic currency assets, manifested in gross capital inflows” (Borio and
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Disyatat, 2011, p. 12). This is exactly what is happening in this model, even with a highly simplified
two way gross flows system, with only one asset traded internationally by private agents.
As a last simulation exercise for this scenario, the parameter  4 representing the positive impact
of FXR on allocation to EM assets is activated. The result, shown in figure 12, show two clear results.
Firstly, the higher the value of the parameter the higher the volatility and the longer the adjustment
to the equilibrium level. A positive  4 gives a procyclical twist to allocations and the exchange rate,
as allocations to EM bills increase as new capital inflows generate accumulation of FXR, and decrease
as FXR falls fall as a result of capital outflows, which amplifies the exchange rate swings. Secondly,
the equilibrium level is lower the higher the value of the parameter. Eﬀectively at the new equilibrium
level, allocations and FXR are higher, but the net factor income has worsened due to the higher
external debt, which results in an exchange rate depreciation.
4.2 Scenario 2: “post-2008”
The second scenario presents multiple shocks to radv, the interest rate on ADV bills. The interest
rate is first decreased from 2.5% to 1% for fourty periods and then is is brought back up. This is
supposed to simulate a scenario similar to what investors have been facing since 2008, with bond
yields dramatically falling as a result of ultra-expansionary monetary policy by advanced countries’
central banks. The increase of interest rates represents the ongoing “tapering” process, and forthcoming
interest rate reversal.
The results of this experiment are shown in 13. The overall chain of events is similar to that
described in the previous section. As a result of the interest rate shock, institutional investors allocate
more to EM bills, which appreciates the exchange rate. This generates a current account deficit, which
sparks higher supply of EM bills, due to higher borrowing needs from the government. This pushes
the exchange rate downwards, therefore improving the trade balance, but the higher interest payments
plunge the economy further into deficit. When interest rates are increased back, the exchange rate
drops a little more, and this time the trade balance starts to improve substantially as to bring back to
current account closer to balance. Indeed, with the rates back to their initial level, the correction is
such that economy experiences a current account surplus, such that it cancels the net additional debt
previously accumulated. As a result the economy is back to initial equilibrium levels.
It is useful once again to compare this to what would happen in the absence of institutional
investors22. In such a situation, shown in figure 14, the dynamics are similar than for the previous
case. The economy experiences an initial appreciation of the currency due to the lower returns on ADV
22Again this is done by putting rˆinst = rinst = rpbo so that eﬀectively institutional investors are pure intermediaries
for households.
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bills and the subsequent change in asset allocation. This generates a deficit in the current account,
due to the same higher financing needs of the EM government. However, unlike the other case, the
current account starts improving due to a rapidly depreciating currency, and a rapidly improving trade
balance. In other words the system simply adjusts back to equilibrium. Indeed for the case without
an explicit behavioural mechanism for institutional investors, this scenario produces exactly the same
results as the previous one: a change in interest rates has the same eﬀect as a change in liquidity
preference, just like in the model of Godley and Lavoie (2012).
Once again the key role in aﬀecting the dynamics of the system is played by the funding gap
(figure 15). Since a lower value of radv generates a positive funding gap - both through assets reductions
and liability increases -, it amplifies the initial shock on the exchange rate, contains its subsequent
fall, and slightly amplifies the second interest rate shock. This eﬀectively results in a higher buildup
of a current account deficit and foreign debt. As a result the exchange rate needs to depreciate even
further in order for the system to be brought back to balance.
Importantly, the process is enhanced for higher values of  1, as figure 13 shows. The higher the
value the higher the initial appreciation and the sharper the subsequent depreciation. This can be
explained by the fact that with higher values for  1 investors care more about their initial higher
underfunding, and therefore invest more aggressively in EM bills and retain the higher allocation for
longer, so long as they remain underfunded. When interest rate rise, the rapid improvement of funding
levels generates a bigger selloﬀ of EM assets, which combined with the higher buildup of imbalances
generates a much sharper depreciation and adjustment process. Unlike the previous scenarios therefore,
the impact of the funding levels on institutional investors portfolio choice, has a destabilising rather
than stabilising role on exchange rates.
Overall the process shows how lower interest rates, when increased back to “normal” levels, gen-
erates a process akin to an EM cycle. As rates are lowered, capital inflows appreciate the currency,
generating a current account deficit (figure 17). The high foreign indebdteness generates a net factor
income deficit, and foces the currency to depreciate, despite the fact that capital keeps flowing in. The
longer and larger the debt buildup the longer and larger the subsequent fall in the exchange rate will
be to bring back the system to equilibrium.
Indeed the increase in exchange rates and their subsequent deterioration since the 2008 crisis, as
shown in figure ??, is similar to the initial phases of the simulation of this scenario. It is indeed well
known that a number of EM, known as the “fragile five”(Johnson, 2015), have faced sharper depre-
ciations since the “tapering” announcements, coupled with higher foreign indebtedness and current
account deficit pressures.
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Finally, in this scenario as in the previous one, the intermediate exchange rate regime, which sees
FXR accumulated as a share of capital inflows, is able to contain the exchange rate swings. As clearly
shown in figure 18, the higher the parameter  1 the higher the reduction in exchange rate volatility,
and the quicker the adjstument to the long-run equilibrium. Once again, a GDP target does not seem
to be as succseful.
5 Conclusion
The SFC model developed in this paper presents some features that are similar to those that this
thesis has put forward. The model features an advanced country with an institutional investor sector,
allocating its assets between ADV and EM bills. The sector promises a certain guaranteed return,
thus generating the possibility of gaps between asset and liabilities. When the gap is positive, in line
with the rest of the arguments presented in this thesis, the sector is assumed to allocate a higher
proportion to EM assets, as these give higher interest rates and therefore a possibility to fill that gap
by earning higher returns.
The two scenarios presented in the paper show the importance of the funding gap mechanism in
determining the dynamics of the model. The funding gap acts as a crucial determinant of portfolio
choice, and therefore of the exchange rate, which is the key macroeconomic variable of this simplified
model. The eﬀect of the funding gap on financial stability of EM is mixed, depending on how it interacts
with the shocks and the other variables. In the case of a shock positively aﬀecting the allocation of
EM - or equivalently a rise in the EM interest rate - it acts as a countercyclical variable, dampening
the eﬀects of capital inflows that such shocks generate and containing the exchange rate movements.
However, when a negative shock to interest rates in advanced countries, it plays a destabilising role,
amplifying the cycles. To use the standard macroeconomic terminology, institutional investors that
have funding targets act procyclically with respect to “push” factors, and countercyclically with respect
to “pull” factors.
The model also shows the importance and consistency of managed floating exchange rate regimes.
A central bank accumulating reserves as a fixed proportion of capital inflows is successful at containing
exchange rate movements, achieving a quicker stabilisation, and also containing the changes in the
long-run equilibrium exchange rates, when these are produced by the model. This may explain why so
many EM resort to these exchange rate regimes. However it is important to say that while eﬀective,
these measures only contain the instability and do not manage to change what ultimately drives the
mechanisms of the model: the portfolio choice of institutional investors. Furthermore, to the extent
that reserves accumulation itself acts as an attractor, being interpreted as a sign of financial strength
by foreign investors, the dynamics of FXR may still generate instabilities.
The overall message of the model confirms the riskiness of the current situation in EMs. The boom
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in EM allocation by institutional investors following the 2008 crisis has been nurtured by the low
yields in advanced countries. Such a situation is however conducive of a buildup of imbalances and
vulnerabilities in EMs, and as a matter of fact a few EMs have been facing current account deficits and
deteriorating external balance sheets in very recent times. An interest rate rise in advanced countries
could trigger further depreciation, which may ultimately correct these imbalances, but may create
substantial harm in the meanwhile. Emerging markets therefore remain under the threat of interest
rate rises in advanced economies, a situation which unfortunately long-term institutional investors do
not seem to improve in the current circumstances.
Appendix
This appendix discusses liability-driven investment, a portfolio choice mechanism adopted by pen-
sion funds and similar investors in recent years. As the name suggests, investors conforming to this
paradigm, make the fullfilment of their liabilities the primary objective of their portfolio choice. The
primary consequence of this framework is to split the portfolio into two parts, a liability-matching
portfolio, whose goal is to protect the current value of the fund’s assets from risks - e.g. changes in
interest rates -, and a return-seeking portfolio, with the purpose of generating returns suﬃcient to
fulfill those obligations. While government-bonds are typically the only asset included in the liability-
matching portfolio, any risky asset can potentially be included in the return-seeking portfolio. The
extent to which liabilities are covered determines the proportion between the two portfolios.
In this model, low-yield bills represent the liability-matching portfolio, whereas high-yield and
emerging markets bills constitute the return-seeking portfolio. The key variable representing allocation
between the two is the funding gap. Equations 43 44 and 45, which represent the portfolio choice
mechanism of institutional invesetors, are the result of such a paradigm. This can shown in a few
mathematical passages. Institutional investors split their portfolio into a liability matching and a
return-seeking portfolio, with weights wLM and wRS , so that wRS +wLM = 1. In case of full funding
(fg = 0), then:
wLM =  0 +  2 · radv wRS = 1   0    2 · radv
with  0 being the parameter which makes institutional investors’ return equal to their promised
one - and thus maintains the fully funded status:
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rˆinst = rinst = rLM · ( 0 +  2 · radv) + rRS · (1   0    2 · radv)
 0 =
rˆinst +  2 · radv(rRS   rLM )  rRS
rLM   rRS
where rRS and rLM are the returns of the returns-seeking and liability-matching portfolios23.
If there are deviations from the fully-funded status the portfolio is supposed to respond linearly on
the funding gap term:
wLM =  0    1fg +  2 · radv
wRS = (1   0) +  1fg    2 · radv
The allocations to each individual asset class in the total portfolio, are determined by the relative
size of the two portfolios (wLM , wRS) as well as their weights within each one of the portfolios:
wi = wi,LM · wLM + wi,RS · wRS (61)
where wi,LM and wi,RS are the portfolio weights to asset i within the liability-matching portfolio
and the return-seeking portfolio.
Be wadv,LM the allocation to low-yield advanced country’s bills within the liability-matching portfo-
lio. Since the liability-matching portfolio only contains this type of assets wLM,adv = 1, and therefore:
wadv =  0    1fg +  2 · radv
Assuming that, within the return-seeking portfolio, assets are allocated according to the tobinesque
principles, plus the FXR impact discussed in the paper:
wadv2,RS =  01    2 · rem +  3 · radv2 +  4
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!
wem,RS = (1   01) +  2 · rem +  3 · radv2 +  4 ·
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!
with wadv2,RS and wem,RS being the allocation to the high-yield and emerging market bill within
the return-seeking portfolio. Replacing into 61:
23 0 in the model is kept exogenous, for the paramters that solve the relationship in the baseline steady state.
Endogenising it according the expression above does not change subtantially any of the results, especially if in a dynamic
context returns are taken as long-term averages rather than only previous period returns.
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wadv2 = ( 0 +  1fg    2 · radv) ·
"
 01    2 · rem +  3 · radv2 +  4
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!#
wem = [(1   0) +  1fg    2 · radv]·
"
(1   01) +  2 · rem    3 · radv2 +  4 ·
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!#
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Figure 9: Exchange rate
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Response of the exchange rate under diﬀerent assumptions for  1, the portoflio choice sensitivity to
funding levels, after an increase in desire to hold EM bills
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Figure 10: Exchange rate under diﬀerent regimes
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Figure 11: Balance of payments components
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Response of the balance of payment components, under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes, after an
increase in desire to hold EM bills. The figure on the left shows the cases of FXR accumulating
according to equation (53a) respectively. The figure on the right shows the cases of FXR accumulating
according to equation (53b). Kflows shows private capital inflows, that is net purchases of institutional
investors of EM bills.
35
Figure 12: Exchange rate with active  4
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Figure 13: Exchange rate and current account
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Figure 14: Exchange rate and current account - no institutional investors
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Figure 15: Funding gap and share of EM bills
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Figure 16: Exchange rates under diﬀerent parameter assumptions
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Figure 17: Balance of payments components
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Figure 18: Exchange rate under diﬀerent regimes
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